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Abstract: The balance between executive compensation and value added is a 
constant challenge for organizations, as well as an important key to minimize agency 
problems. This study aims to evaluate the relationship between term of payment and 
compensation variability and the executives’ risk perception, as well as their 
motivation to add value, using the agency theory and the executive compensation 
literature as references for the study. Quantitative methods were applied, by collecting 
primary data from 121 Brazilian executives who answered a survey regarding their 
company’s compensation program models and their risk perception. Study results 
showed that executives' risk perception, as well as their motivation to add value, have 
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statistically significant relationship with the level of compensation variability. 
Statistically significant relationship was also found between individual characteristics, 
such as age and time working for the organization, and the executive’s risk perception. 
Keywords – Executive compensation; Agency theory; Risk perception; Corporate 
governance. 
Resumo: O equilíbrio entre remuneração dos executivos e valor agregado é um 
desafio constante para as organizações, além de ser uma chave importante para 
minimizar os problemas de agência. Este estudo tem como objetivo avaliar a relação 
entre a variabilidade do prazo de pagamento e remuneração e a percepção de risco dos 
executivos, bem como sua motivação para agregar valor, usando a Teoria da Agência e 
a literatura sobre remuneração de executivos como referências para o estudo. Foram 
aplicados métodos quantitativos, coletando dados primários de 121 executivos 
brasileiros que responderam a uma pesquisa sobre os modelos de programas de 
remuneração de sua empresa e sua percepção de risco. Os resultados do estudo 
mostraram que a percepção de risco dos executivos, bem como sua motivação para 
agregar valor, têm relação estatisticamente significativa com o nível de variabilidade 
da remuneração. Também foi encontrada relação estatisticamente significante entre 
características individuais, como idade e tempo de trabalho na organização e percepção 
de risco do executivo. 




The way a company compensates its executives can really make a difference for its success. 
Keeping executives motivated and adding value to shareholders necessarily depends on the incentive 
model adopted by the organization. The problem is that the same incentive created to encourage the 
executives’ effort to maximize results can also lead them to commit fraudulent acts. 
Since the start of the 20th century, aligning the interests of the various stakeholders of an 
organization has been a challenge faced by companies that adopt models where the control and the 
management are performed by agents different from those who hold their ownership.This challenge is 
reflected in the Agency Theory, which represents the analysis of potential conflicts between capital 
owners (principal) and capital managers (agents), the interpretation of which, according to Eisenhardt 
(1989, p. 60), can provide a comprehensive view of how conflicts of interest take place in organizations 
and what mechanisms can be used to minimize them. 
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According to Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004), well-designed compensation packages can 
mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders. In this sense, according to the authors, 
remuneration policies cannot be thought without the interrelationships between financial markets, the 
company and corporate governance. 
For Gonzaga, Yoshinaga and Eid Junior (2013), in addition to motivating executives to achieve 
the best results for the organization, the incentive programs play an essential role in aligning the interests 
of principal and agent. 
The use of mechanisms such as short and long-term compensation and the application of 
Variable Compensation (VC) instruments, aligned with the creation of value, rather than fixed 
compensations, are examples of incentive models that can be applied to achieve such goals. In this 
context, variables such as term of payment and compensation variability play a key role in balancing the 
interests of executives and shareholders. 
Executives’ risk perception is at the core of the incentive program. According to Slovic and 
Peters (2006), individuals perceive risks in two manners: a) through intuitive or instinctive feelings; or 
b) through logical analysis, based on facts and historical data. In this context, understanding the way 
executives of an organization perceive risks is essential to establish an effective incentive model since 
such understanding makes it possible to set compensations that minimize the agent’s uncertainties 
regarding benefits he will earn and, consequently, maximize his efforts to add value to shareholders. 
This study aims to evaluate the relationship between term of payment and compensation 
variability and the executives’ risk perception, as well as their motivation to add value, using the agency 
theory and the executive compensation literature as references for the study. 
In said context, this research generates practical results in order to assist organizations in 
designing their incentive programs and minimizing potential conflicts arising from this program. 
Additionally, a relevant contribution of this study focuses on the incorporation of individual variables 
such as executive’s risk perception nd motivation to add value to de Companies. Finally, it should be 
noted that, unlike most studies on executive compensation in Brazil, which are based on secondary data, 
this article presents a relevant contribution in researching the phenomenon based on primary data, by 
contacting Brazilian executives directly. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical foundation of this research is supported by diverse currents of the literature 
related to incentive programs, agency problems and executives’ risk perception, taking into account: 
2.1 Performance mesures and compensation models;  
2.2 The influence of the Agency Theory on incentive programs and motivation of agents; 
2.3 Executives’ risk perception. 
Performance mesures and compensation models 
Two elements are the basis of an incentive program: the performance measures and the 
compensations. 
The establishment of performance measures to assess the creation of value and, consequently, 
compensate the agent, is the starting point of a good incentive program. 
According to Lambert and Larcker (1987), the measures commonly used are based on: a) 
accounting indicators, for example, return on equity (ROE); or b) market performance indicators, for 
example, variation in the company’s share value. For these authors, indicators based on market 
performance are more often used when: 
a) The company’s financial statements present high variations in the lines of revenues, expenses 
or investments during the years; 
b) The company is going through a period of accelerated growth in sales or is expanding its 
assets; 
c) Executives own little or no value in the company’s shares. 
Regarding remuneration policies, Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) clarify that they must 
comprise three dimensions: 
a) The expected total benefits associated with the job or position: are the total expected benefits 
that determine the attraction and retention of executivos, including non-pecuniary benefits; 
b) The composition of the remuneration package: relating to the determination of the individual 
elements of a remuneration package, so that no resources are wasted; 
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c) The relation between pay and performance: definition of which actions and results will be 
rewarded and which will be penalized. 
With respect to compensations, it is important to emphasize the main aspects related to: 
a) Financial compensation or remuneration: defined by Milkovich and Boudreau (2000, p. 381) 
as the “financial return and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment 
relationship”; 
b) Non-financial compensation: defined by Krauter (2013) as the set of factors associated to the 
possibility of career advancement, personal and professional development, career planning and 
counseling, outplacement in case of dismissal, internal recruitment and preparation for retirement. 








Figure 1. Categories of Executive Compensation 
Source: Adapted from Krauter (2013) 
 
The composition of the compensation package can affect the types of executives the company 
can attract. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) exemplify that a package with high retirement benefits 
will attract potential executives who plan to stay with the company for a long time; A high-opportunity 
bonus package will attract executives who are less risk-averse, more optimistic, and more confident 
about their ability to create value. 
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According to Souza, Duque and Silva Jr. (2016), “a compensation plan including many short-
term compensations may influence the accounting choices of executives, as they start to act with a short-
term mindset, adversely affecting the interests of shareholders in the long term.” 
Long-term compensation (LTC) is usually linked to performance and generation of results in the 
long term, which makes its design more challenging since the measurement of results is not always an 
easy task 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) emphasize the importance of long-term compensations as they 
indicate that stock option programs provide incentives to executives that are aligned with the principal’s 
interests in the long term. The authors also recommend adopting restriction practices or even returning 
compensations in case of future losses. As an example, a situation of republication of the results of prior 
years can be mentioned in which the creation of value was lower than the basis used to compensate the 
executive. 
The influence of the Agency Theory on incentive programs and the motivation of agents 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308), the agency problem starts when one or more 
persons who hold ownership of an organization (principal) hire executives (agents) and assign the 
responsibility for managing the business to them, in such a way that the agent will be compensated 
according to a set of results agreed upon with the principal. The authors use the metaphor of a contract 
to define such an agreement on the alignment, which includes the principal’s expectations regarding the 
creation of value, the agent’s commitments and the forms of compensation the agent will have if the 
goals are achieved. In this relationship, the agent doesn’t always takes initiatives that will generate a 
sustainable value for the principal and, if such set of agreed results is not properly designed or if a 
proper supervision of measures is not taken by the agent, he will be compensated without having added 
value to the principal or, even worse, he will take excessive risks on behalf of the organization as a way 
of maximizing his compensations. 
Pepper and Gore (2012) suggest that an incentive program capable of motivating the agent in an 
effective (aligning interests of the principal and principal) and efficient (achieving results with the 
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lowest possible cost) way should align mechanisms of intrinsic, natural motivation of the individual, and 
extrinsic motivation, due, for example, to financial incentives. In addition to intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation, the following factors influence the outcome of the incentive program: 
a) Executive risk profile: the extent to which the agent is willing to risk his remuneration. 
b) Time orientation: the discount rate or additional reward used for long-term payments may 
vary according to the executive's profile and should be studied on a case-by-case basis. 
c) Balance between effort and reward: the executive tends to seek to apply effort to measures 
that bring its expected utility. 
Hart and Holmstrom (1986) point that contract theories started to consider issues related to 
incentive and market at a later time. Specifically, regarding employment contracts, the authors retrieved 
some studies that sought to advance theoretically on the issues, but concluded that progress was limited 
and that they encounter little knowledge about what has been called 'implicit employment contracts'. For 
the authors (1986, p.127), however, “rather than abandoning the contracting framework, therefore, it 
seems desirable to try to modify it so as to make it more realistic, for example by incorporating further 
moral hazards or asymmetries of information ”, as performed here in this study. 
The use of contractual conditions that penalize the agent's adverse behavior can be an important 
mechanism for equalizing incentive programs. The use of contingency mechanisms was provided for in 
Resolution No. 3921/2010 of the Central Bank of Brazil - BACEN (2010), applicable to financial 
institutions in Brazil. This resolution, in its Article 2, establishes that part of the variable remuneration of 
executives will be retained for a period of time, as a way to encourage executives to adopt measures that 
preserve the company's value in the medium and long terms. This retention occurs in the form of 
deferred payment. 
For Bebchuk and Fried (2005), incentive programs fail in their function of regulating and 
minimizing the agency problems. The difficulties in supervision by the agent, the adoption of non-
transparent measures, the manipulation of results, or even the lack of independence of the Board of 
Directors at the time of establishing the executive compensation program may place the incentive 
program at the core of the conflict of interest and increase the agency problem. 




Revista BASE – v.17, n.4, outubro/dezembro 2020 
 
Executives’ risk perception and risk-taking. 
The risk perception of an individual derives from many factors. For Sjöberg (2000), ideological 
values, sensitivity and fear are the three variables that can explain risk perception, namely: 
a) Ideological values influence the way an individual conceives the risk. The author mentions, as 
an example, that people who defend the production of energy through nuclear power plants as an 
alternative to foster the economy and preserve the quality of life perceive low risk of leakage of 
radioactive elements and vice-versa. Therefore, the interpretation of the context of a risk event and the 
individual’s position on the acceptance of the consequences of an event seen essentially as benefits may 
affect his risk perception; 
b) The sensitivity to risk reflects the level of risk aversion or neutrality, which is measured 
through rating scales (as high, medium or low); 
c) Fear arises from specific events, which are perceived by the individual as harmful 
consequences of a certain event. For each risk event, damage will be foreseen representing the worst-
case scenario, which, in its turn, influences the risk perception. 
Sjöberg (2000) also states that an individual’s risk perception regarding events that affect him 
directly is different from the risk perception involving other people, such as his family or people in 
general. 
Identifying the agent’s profile and his interpretation of risk perception is an additional challenge 
for the development of an incentive program. For Weber and Milimman (1997) the risk profile is 
inherent to the individual; risk perception, however, may vary depending on the circumstances or past 
events and, therefore, the attitude towards risks may be driven by events that took place in the 
executive’s daily life or by historical facts. For example: an individual may perceive low risk in 
decisions regarding his personal life but high risk in his professional decisions, presenting different 
levels of risk sensitivity in each situation. In the authors’ opinion, records of materialization of risks in 
the past may increase risk sensitivity. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the basic measurement unit for analyzing the agency theory 
corresponds to the agreements entered into by and between the principal and the agent. In this context, 
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the author indicates that managing risks related to the agency problems is directly related to the 
principal’s capacity of establishing a relationship with the agent in which the parties’ interests and 
commitments are sufficiently explicit. In order to better align interests, it is also important to know and 
respect the agent’s risk profile, as well as the level of supervision the principal should exercise over the 
agent. 
Eisenhardt (1989) mentions some possibilities for a proper balance when sharing risks between 
the agent and the principal, according to the characteristics of each stakeholder. Risk-neutral agents have 
a perception with lower risk sensitivity and tend to undertake more uncertainties. On the other hand, 
risk-averse agents have more risk sensitivity and tend to not accept uncertainties. In the author’s opinion, 
the incentive model should take into account the agent’s acceptance regarding the principal’s risk 
transfer, according to Table 1. 
 
Professional Risk profile More applicable incentive model 
Agent 
Risk averse 
Models with less variation resulting from assessment of 
performance 
Risk neutral 




Models based on performance, with variable 
compensation 
Risk neutral 
Models with less variation resulting from assessment of 
performance 
Table 1. Relation between models of incentive programs and principal-agent risk profiles 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) 
 
For Eisenhardt (1989), a risk-neutral professional is more susceptible to undertaking risks than a 
risk-averse professional. Regarding this relation, Cooper and Faseruk (2011), on the other hand, states 
that in cases in which the risk perception is high, the risk-taking behavior tends to be less recurrent. 
Behavioral variables should also be considered upon assessment of the risk perception (and risk-
taking). Seo and Sharma (2018), researching the restaurant industry in the USA, identified a connection 
between CEO overconfidence and risk-taking. Results suggested that overconfident executives tend to 
strategically adopt riskier investments. 
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Chng and Wang (2016), in their research, analyzed career ambition and strategic risk behaviors. 
Based on an experiment, the authors concluded that in situations where performance levels are 
decreasing, managers’ career ambitions intensified the managers’ response to incentive programs. 
However, in opposite situations (increase in performance levels), career ambitions did not influence the 
managers’ response to incentive programs. 
Research Methodology 
Outlining the hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical foundation researched, it was possible to establish the theoretical basis, 
their connections and the cause and effect relationships, which are summarized in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic view of incentive programs as an instrument for creation of value or drivers of risks arising 
from agency problems 
Source: Authors 
 
Figure 2 makes it evident that the agent’s risk perception can be a variable that influences the 
path between the incentive program and the creation of value for the organization. This is the key 
subject of this study, which was submitted to the research techniques applied and tested through the 
hypotheses listed below.  
The relation between the qualification criteria components in Figure 2 was tested through the 
connectors specified in Figure 3, including the main lines of research and theoretical foundations used. 








Figure 3. Legend of the researched relation between the theoretical foundations 
Source: Authors 
 
Considering that the main objective of the study was to verify the relation between incentive 
programs and executives’ risk perception, as well as the relation between incentive programs and the 
creation of value for organizations, the research methodology was directed to analyzing if the incentive 
models combining variable and long-term compensations can reduce the agent’s uncertainties regarding 
the benefits he will eventually earn and, consequently, maximize his efforts for shareholder value 
creation, in addition to preventing agents from adopting measures that may expose the organization to 
unacceptable risk levels. 
This study tests the hypotheses mentioned below, taking into account the evaluation of the 
theoretical foundations listed herein. 
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a) H1: There is a positive correlation between the term of payment of compensations and the 
executive’s motivation for the creation of value in organizations; 
b) H2: There is a positive correlation between the variability of compensations and the 
executive’s motivation for the creation of value in organizations. 
c) H3: There is a positive correlation between the term of payment of compensations and the 
executive’s risk perception1; 
H4: There is a positive correlation between the variability of compensations established in the 
incentive programs and the executive’s risk perception2. 
Applied techniques 
The study contemplated a descriptive research with a quantitative approach. Using likert scales 
applied to a sample of executives from companies in different segments of the market, it was possible to 
collect data regarding the compensation models applied for executives participating in the research, as 
well as their level of motivation and their risk perceptions depending on the compensation models used 
in their companies. 
The following techniques were applied: 
a) The reliability of the collection instrument used in the research was tested based on the 
calculation of Cronbach’s Alpha, as suggested by Hair et al. (2009); 
b) The normality test of data distribution was performed based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests, considering a 5% probability of error. These tests are recommended by Hair et al. 
(2009) as a way of assessing the asymmetry level in data distribution and supporting the election of the 
tests to be applied; 
c) Finally, the quantitative method of logistic regression was used, which, according to Hair et 
al. (2009), corresponds to a special form of regression, in which the non-metric and binary dependent 
 
1 A positive correlation between LTC and risk perception assumes that, the greater the LTC level, the higher the tendency of risk-taking by 
the executive. 
2 A positive correlation between VC and risk perception assumes that, the greater the VC level, the higher the tendency of risk-taking by 
the executive. 
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variable represents a multivariable relation with the regression coefficients, evidencing the relative 
impact of each independent variable (predictors); 
d) The adjustment ratio of the logistic regression models was tested based on Hosmer-
Lemeshow statistics. 
Population, sample and collected data 
Two hundred executives from medium and large-sized Brazilian companies in several segments 
of the market, with national and foreign capital, were invited to participate in the research. Invitations 
were sent by means of emails with access links designated. Only executives holding leadership positions 
were invited, selected from a database of professionals of the researchers’ relationship network. 
A self-administered survey was applied to this population of executives, aiming at testing the 
hypotheses through questionnaires addressing the researched variables. Likert scale questions were used, 
with answers ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, and including somewhat disagree and 
somewhat agree. 
Out of the 200 executives invited, 155 agreed to answer the questionnaire, of which 121 
concluded the entire process, determining a valid return ratio of 60% as basis for the research. Using the 
same definitions used by Hair et al. (2009), the minimum sample of nine observations per independent 
variable in a logistic regression test was respected, as six independent variables were used in the 
research and 121 valid observations were considered. 
Variables used 
In order to improve the predictive power of the statistical models applied in Research 2, the 
results of the questions collected in ordinal format, which represent the dependent variables, were 
converted to binary format, considering the following criteria: 
a) Dependent variables: dependent variables corresponded to the executive’s risk profile, as well 
as the incentive program’s power of persuasion to lead the executive to create value. 
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− The dependent variable related to the incentive program’s power of persuasion to motivate the 
executive into creating value for the organization was used to test hypothesis H1 and H2. This variable 
resulted from the joint analysis of the answers to the two questions below: 
 
The way I am rewarded today maximizes my motivation to make the most effort to generate the 
most value for the organization I work for. 
The way I am rewarded today has the best possible balance between fixed and variable 
remuneration. 
 
For responses with values equivalent to totally agree or partially agree, a value of 1 was assigned 
to the dependent variable. For responses equivalent to partially disagree and strongly disagree, a value of 
0 was assigned to the dependent variable. The level equivalent to indifference was not considered and 
this decision did not influence the result, since there were few responses in this regard.   
Similar criteria were adopted by Araújo (2012), in his study on the role of subcultures in risk 
perception and behavior in an organization, when the author adopted the premise that only high 
agreement responses would be converted to a value of 1 on the scale binary. 
 
− The dependent variable related to the executive’s risk perception, used to test hypotheses H3 
and H4, resulted from the analysis of responses to 7 situations that tried to measure the executive’s risk 
perception, in which the participants answered the questions reproduced below: 
In order to achieve the goals included in the criteria for assessing my performance, I would be 
willing to: 
i. Fail to comply with internal standards that I consider bureaucratic and unnecessary; 
ii. Encourage subordinates to excessive working hours, adventitiously exceeding 10 daily hours; 
iii. Deliver  products  or  services with slightly inferior quality, imperceptible to the client, in 
order to maximize the company’s profit; 
iv. Accept the merits for other person’s achievements (a member of my team or a peer); 
v. Occasionally fail to comply with laws or regulations applicable to my professional activities; 
vi. Fail to comply with precepts set forth in the company’s code of conduct; 
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vii. Offer, promise or provide improper advantage to public officials in order to promote gains to 
the company. 
For this variable, considering that the tolerance limit for the 7 questions included in the 
questionnaire should be minimum for a risk-averse individual, the value 0 was only assigned to 
“strongly disagree” answers, in which it is considered that the individual has a risk-averse perception. 
The value 1 was assigned to all other answers, in which it is considered that the individual has a risk-
neutral perception, and, in this case, it is assumed that the individual is inclined to take some risks in 
order to maximize his compensations. 
The use of the terms risk neutral or risk averse to classify executive’s risk perception follows the 
same definitions used by Eisenhardt (1989), who uses the same terms to characterize the executive’s risk 
perception within the context of the agency theory. 
b) Independent variables: descriptive information regarding the incentive programs provided by 
individuals in the research, in addition to demographic data, such as age, time working at the company, 
number of children, gender, level of VC and level of LTC. 
With these variables, it was possible to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4, by studying the 
effect of several compensation models and personal characteristics (independent variables) on the risk 
perception (dependent variable of model 1 of logistic regression) and on the power of persuasion of the 
incentive program to lead the executive into creating value (dependent variable of model 2 of logistic 
regression). 
Analysis of Results 
Reliability of the collection instrument 
According to Hair et al. (2009), Cronbach’s Alpha (α) coefficient is the most used measure to 
assess the reliability of collection instruments used in scientific researches. Therefore, such measure was 
chosen to assess the consistency of the scales used in the research questionnaire. 
The coefficient α calculated for the collection instrument was 0.601. Maroco and Garcia-
Marques (2006) affirm that an average coefficient α of 0.60 can be acceptable in scientific researches. 
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Hair et al. (2009) also suggest that the minimum acceptable coefficient α is 0.60. Therefore, the 
collection instrument was reliable pursuant to the minimum acceptable levels of reliability. 
Descriptive statistics 
The sample used in the Research was composed of 121 executives who fully concluded the 
information collection questionnaire. Of these, 52% of the executives participating in the research were 
directors, superintendents or CEO’s and 48% held manager positions. The respondents work at 
companies from several marke segments, however, there is a concentration of 48% in the services 
segment. 
With respect to the VC compensation models adopted for the majority of executives who formed 
part of the sample, such compensation does not exceed 30% of the total compensation, as can be 
observed in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of VC representativity on total compensation 
Source: Authors 
 
As it was found in the research carried out by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2017), the majority 
(88%) of the sample of executives participating in this study (Figure 5) stated they do not receive LTC. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of  LTC representativity on total compensation 
Source: Authors 
 
The low level of use of LTC instruments jeopardizes the alignment of the interests of the agent 
and the principal, increasing the risk of agency conflict. According to Farrell, Kadous and Towry (2008), 
organizations that use LTC measures encourage their executives to think of the organization’s 
perpetuity. 
Regarding descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables: 
• Men represent 87% of the sample and, in the average of the survey responses, indicated 
having a more neutral perception of risks than women; 
• Professionals between 30 and 40 years old represent 39% of the sample and, in the average of 
the survey responses, represented the age group with the highest percentage of professionals with neutral 
perception of risks. In the 40- to 50-year-old age group and over 60, the percentage of risk-averse 
professionals was higher than the risk-neutral one. 
• Professionals with less than 5 years of work in the current company represent 37% of the 
sample and, in the average of the survey responses, represented the time period in the company with the 
highest percentage of professionals with a neutral perception of risks. The percentage of professionals 
with more than 20 years of risk-averse company was higher than the risk-neutral ones, which 
demonstrates that, in the analyzed population, the longer the time at home, the greater the risk aversion. 
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• When analyzing the distribution of the risk perception of professionals among the ranges of 
representativeness of variable remuneration, in the average of the sample surveyed, it is noticed that the 
lower the representativeness of variable remuneration, the greater the percentage of executives averse to 
risk. 
• When analyzing the distribution of the power of induction for the generation of value among 
the ranges of representativeness of the variable remuneration, in the average of the researched sample, it 
is noticed that the professionals who receive higher proportions of variable remuneration are those who 
answer that the remuneration models motivates them to generate value. As the ranges of 
representativeness of variable compensation fall, the percentage of positive responses related to the 
executive's motivation also reduces. 
• When analyzing the distribution of the perception of risk of professionals among the ranges of 
representativeness of long-term remuneration, in the average of the sample surveyed, it is noticed that 
the lower the representativeness of long-term remuneration, the greater the percentage of executives 
averse to risk. 
• When analyzing the distribution of the power of induction for the generation of value among 
the representative ranges of long-term remuneration, in the average of the sample surveyed, in the two 
groups the number of executives with positive responses is higher than the number of executives with 
negative responses. 
Normality test of the data distribution 
The normality test of the data distribution was measured through Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. Both had a probability of error of 5%, and the results suggest that such data have a 
non-normal distribution. 
This result supports the election of the logistic regression test for this research, which, according 
to  Hair et al. (2009), includes samples with non-normal data distribution. 
Logistic regression models 
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Two logistic regression models were developed: 
a) Model 1 of logistic regression 
b) Model 2 of logistic regression 
Model 1 of logistic regression 
In this model 1, hypotheses H2 and H3 were tested by evaluating the chances of an executive 
adopting a risk-neutral or risk-averse position, according to variations in the independent variables, 
represented by the compensation models and demographic characteristics. 
As the logistic regression model stepwise forward was used, three steps were considered, until a 
set of independent variables that best represents the regression model to assess the probability of risk-
taking by the executive was found. 
 
 
  b S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Representativityof VC 0.430 0.177 5.914 1 0.015 1.538 
Constant -0.967 0.542 3.188 1 0.074 0.380 
Step 2b Representativity of  VC 0.533 0.190 7.852 1 0.005 1.704 
Age -0.603 0.229 6.904 1 0.009 0.547 
Constant 0.400 0.750 0.284 1 0.594 1.491 
Step 3c Representativity of VC 0.585 0.199 8.646 1 0.003 1.795 
Age -0.534 0.238 5.012 1 0.025 0.586 
Time working at the company -0.292 0.149 3.814 1 0.051 0.747 
Constant 0.789 0.791 0.994 1 0.319 2.201 
a. Variable included in step 1: Representation VC.   
b. Variable included in step 2: Age. 
c. Variable included in step 3: Time working at the company. 
Table 2. Variables in the equation of model 1 of logistic regression 
Source: Authors 
 
As it is possible to notice in Table 2, three variables have statistical significance to compose the 
model, with a standard error of 5%. 
The results of model 1 of logistic regression proposes that: 
a) VC representativity increases  the chances of leading the executive into adopting a risk-
neutral attitude: with odds ratio of 1.79, the result for model 1 of logistic regression suggests that 
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incentive programs with greater VC representativity increase by 1.79 the chances of leading the 
executive into adopting a risk-neutral attitude. 
 
Representativity of VC 
Probability of the executive taking more risks in order to 
maximize his compensations 
Zero  (does not receive VC) 80% 
Up to 10% in VC 88% 
Between 10% and 30% in VC 93% 
Between 30% and 50% in VC 96% 
Over 50% in VC 98% 
Table 3. Levels of probability of executives assuming a risk-neutral perception according to the VC level   
Source: Author 
 
According to Table 3, models in which more than half of the executive’s compensation is 
variable have a 98% probability of leading him into adopting a risk-neutral attitude, in other words, 
taking more risks.  
b) Senior executives tend to adopt a more risk-adverse attitude: With odds ratio of 0.58, the 




Probability of the executive taking more risks in order to maximize 
his compensations 
<30 years 56% 
between 30 and 40 years 43% 
between 40 and 50 years 31% 
between 50 and 60 years 21% 
>60 years 13% 
Table 4. Levels of probability of executives assuming a risk-neutral perception according to age 
Source: Author 
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According to Table 4, executives who are over 60 years of age have only a 13% probability of 
adopting a risk-neutral attitude, while executives who are under 30 years of age have a 56% probability 
of adopting a risk-neutral attitude.  
c) Executives who have worked for a longer time in the company tend to take less risk: 
Executives in a long pe With odds ratioof 0.75, the result for model 1 of logistic regression suggests that, 
after a longer period working at the company, executives tend to adopt a more risk-adverse attitude. 
 
Time working at the company 
Probability of the executive taking more risks in order to maximize his 
compensations 
less than 5 years 62% 
between 5 and 10 years 55% 
between 10 and 15 years 48% 
between 15 and 20 years 41% 
>20 years 34% 
Table 5. Levels of probability of executives assuming a risk-neutral perception according to the time working at the company        
Source: Authors 
 
Table 5 illustrates the distribution of probabilities of risk-averse perceptions as executives work 
for a longer period at the company. Executives who have been working at the company for more than 20 
years have only a 34% probability of adopting a risk-neutral attitude, while executives who have been 
working for less than 5 years have a 62% probability of adopting a risk-neutral attitude. 
A substantial statistical significance was not noted in the relation between the level of long-term 
compensation and the executives’ risk perception. 
Other independent variables (number of children and gender) did not present a statistical 
significance and were removed from model 1 of logistic regression. 
The adjustment ratios of model 1 of logistic regression presented in Table 6, tested by Hosmer-
Lemeshow statistical test, presented satisfactory results, with a significance coefficient of 0.545, greater 
than the minimumof 0.05 recommended (Hair et al., 2009). 
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Summary of the model 
 
Chi-square 6.925 
Degrees of freedom 8 
Sig. Hosmer and Lemeshow 0.545 
Log-2 likelihood 147.721
b 
Cox & Snell R-square 14% 
Nagelkerke R-square 18% 
Table 6. Adjustment ratios of model 1 of logistic regression 
Source: Authors 
 
Additionally, it was found that the average of correct predictions of model 1 was 69%, which 
indicates a good predictive power. 
Model 2 of logistic regression 
In this model, hypotheses H1 and H2 were tested by evaluating the chances of an executive being 
motivated to create value, according to variations in the independent variables, represented by the 
compensation models and demographic characteristics. 
Even though the logistic regression method stepwise forward was used, Table 7 presents that 
only one step of the model was implemented, as only the independent variable related to VC was 
considered significant. 
 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Representativity of VC 0.844 0.242 12.116 1 0.000 2.326 
Constant -0.959 0.638 2.260 1 0.133 0.383 
a. Variable included in step 1: Representativity of VC. 




With odds ratio of 2.3, the result for model 2 of logistic regression suggests that incentive 
programs with greater representativity of VC increase by 2.3 the chances of leading the executive into 
being motivated to create value. 
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Representativity of VC 
Probability of executives being more motivated to 
create value 
Zero (does not receive VC) 
47% 
Up to 10% in VC 
67% 
Between 10% and 30% in VC 
83% 
Between 30% and 50% in VC 
92% 
Over 50% in VC 
96% 
Table 8. Levels of probability of executives being motivated according to representativity of VC 
Source: Authors 
 
Table 8 demonstrates the the power of persuasion of the incentive program to motivate the 
executive to create value for the organization. It illustrates the distribution of probabilities of 
persuading the executive into being motivated to create value as the representativity of VC over the 
executive’s total compensation increases.  
The result reveals that more representative the remuneration, the greater the agent's 
motivation. Models in which more than half of the executive’s compensation is variable have a 96% 
probability of persuading him/her into being motivated to create value for the organization, against a 
47% probability of essentially fixed compensation models. 
The result found can be compared to previous studies as follows: 
a) Aguiar and Pimentel (2017) found a similar result when their study demonstrated that there is 
a positive and significant correlation between variable compensation and the financial performance of 
researched companies; 
b) Gonzaga, Yoshinaga and Eid Junior (2013) found a positive and significant correlation 
between VC and companies’ market performance, measured through earnings per share and return per 
share. However, even though a positive and significant correlation between VC and ROE was found, the 
coefficient was negative, which indicates an inverse relation between VC and financial performance; 
c) Camargos and Helal (2007) found a positive correlation between executives’ compensation 
and companies’ performance; 
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d) In their study on compensation models in companies in the Brazilian electricity sector, 
Nascimento, Franco and Cherobim (2012) did not find a positive or significant correlation between the 
level of variable compensation and indicators of financial performance, including ROE. 
The adjustment ratios of model 2 of logistic regression showed in Table 9, tested by Hosmer-
Lemeshow statistical test, presented satisfactory results, with a significance coefficient of 0.072, greater 
than the minimum of 0.05 recommended (Hair et al., 2009).  
 
Summary of the model  
Chi-square 6,989 
Degrees of freedom 3 
Sig. Hosmer and Lemeshow 0.072 
Log-2 likelihood 111.327a 
Cox & Snell R-square 11% 
Nagelkerke R-square 18% 




Additionally, it was found that the average of correct predictions of model 2 was 81%, which 
indicates a good predictive power. 
A substantial statistical significance between LTC and executives’ motivation to create value was 
not found. 
In their study on the influence of the implementation of long-term compensation models, 
Nascimento et al. (2013) did not find a statistically significant difference in the performance of 
companies that adopt compensation instruments based on stock options in comparison with companies 
that do not adopt such mechanism. Beuren, Silva and Mazzioni (2014) noted in their study that there are 
no significant differences between financial performance and the implementation or not of share-based 
compensation. However, the authors identified a positive alignment between the compensation by stock 
options and the market performance of researched companies. 
 
Discussion of Results and Practical Implications 
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Study results make it evident that there is a strong influence of the level of representativity of VC 
on risk perception and also on the incentive programs’ capacity of motivating executives to create value, 
which supports hypotheses H2 and H4. 
All techniques applied lead to the conclusion that increasing representativity of VC induces 
executives to being motivated to create more value. In other words, models combining executives’ 
compensation with organization’s results can produce better results. On the other hand, all applied 
techniques also lead to the conclusion that increasing VC leads executives to taking more risks on behalf 
of the organization. This potential paradox imposes an additional challenge for organizations upon the 
design of their compensation models. The challenge is to identify the correct balance between the 
representativity of the VC in the incentive program, in order to guarantee the adequate motivation of the 
agent, balanced with the level of risk to be assumed by the agent to achieve his goals and maximize his 
compensation. 
The effect of compensations on the executives’ risk perception was another relevant research 
finding. Increasing VC leads executives to adopt a more risk-neutral perception, which means that the 
offer of a potential increase in gains can cause executives to adopt behaviors that lead to taking more 
risks in order to maximize their compensation. Compensation programs with essentially fixed 
compensations lead executives to a more risk-averse perception. This conclusion can make organizations 
rethink their compensation models, as to adjusting the aggressiveness of the variability level according 
to the risk appetite undertaken by their executives. 
Personal characteristics, such as age and time working at the company, were also considered 
relevant for risk perception. These conclusions make it possible to identify the best way to balance the 
representativity of VC according to the executive’s demographic characteristics. 
Through the interpretation of the results for this research and its adaptation to the reality of each 
organization, it is possible to develop optimized incentive models, taking into account the variables 
assessed and relations identified. The effectiveness of an incentive program depends on its alignment 
with the strategy and can result from factors such as: i. Organization’s strategy and risk appetite; ii. 
Demographic aspects of the executive personnel; and iii. Level of complexity, communication plan and 
acceptance of the model by the executives. 
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Figure 6. Elements that may determine the effectiveness of incentive programs 
Source: Authors 
 
The combination of the three elements in Figure 6 will determine if the incentive program will 
present the right amount of motivation for executives, without leading them to exceed the limits of risk-
taking expected by the company. 
a) Organization’s strategy and risk appetite: Companies seeking growth and counting on stronger 
governance structures can adopt more aggressive compensation models, with more representative VC 
levels, even though this means taking more risk, as the correlation between VC level and executive’s 
tendency to taking risks is positive, and it also motivates the creation of value. In this case, the increase 
in the propensity for creating value may offset the increase in the propensity for risk-taking by the 
executive. On the other hand, it is clear that organizations with more aggressive VC models should 
invest more in governance and count on stronger supervision structures and internal controls in order to 
offset the increase in risk exposure; 
b) Older executives tend to have a lesser disposition to risk exposure, therefore, implementing more 
aggressive VC instruments for older professionals may not influence their risk perception with the same 
intensity as it would influence younger professionals; 
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c) Level of complexity, communication plan and acceptance of the model by executives: The model’s 
simplicity and transparency can ensure greater effectiveness in the motivating effect of incentive 
programs, especially regarding LTC. The current study did not demonstrate a significant relation 
between executives’ motivation and LTC level, possibly due to the low level of implementation of such 
practice and due to the fact that it is not widely known in Brazil (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2017). This 
statement confirms the findings from Pepper, Gore and Crossman (2013), which show that unawareness 
and uncertainty cause executives to have reservations and not to be motivated by LTC. 
Comparing with Eisenhardt (1989) findings regarding the Agency Theory, this framework shows 
that the circumstances in which the agent and the principal diverge in the definition of objectives, 
especially in the division of levels of importance to the capital / labor paradox, require governance 
mechanisms that take into account specific characteristics of the Organization, the principal and the 
agent, such as demographic aspects and risk tolerance limits. 
 
Final Considerations 
In practical terms, the results of this study bring a series of assumptions that may be potentially 
adopted by organizations upon the development of their incentive programs. Compensation models 
should be adapted taking into account both the target audience (executives) and the organization’s 
strategy. 
The small number of companies adopting LTC models represented a limitation for this 
research.The finding, however, coincides with the results of the research carried out by Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu (2017), which demonstrated that less than 15% of the 140 Brazilian companies researched 
adopt long-term compensations. Due to this limitation, the statistical power of models used to test 
hypotheses H1 and H3 was reduced. 
Despite the mentioned limitation, this study brings important contributions in addition to the 
results presented. This is one of the pioneering studies in Brazil that sought to analyze executive 
compensation based on data collected directly from executives. Most studies on the phenomenon are 
carried out using secondary data. Theoretically, the article also advances by incorporating individual 
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variables in the tested models, such as risk perception and motivation to add value, associating them 
with variations in executive remuneration. 
Regarding suggestions for future studies, it is possible to highlight that the assessment of 
variables associated with executive motivation can be performed in a broader manner, since 
compensation is not the only instrument used to mitigate the risks of agency conflicts (Eisenhardt, 
1989). It is important to take into account other elements forming part of the instruments for alignment 
of interests, such as: 
a) Mechanisms that develop the executive’s intrinsic motivation; 
b) Corporate governance; 
c) Organizational culture;  
d) Behavior facing risk; 
e) Impact on the executives’ risk perception of regional aspects, macroeconomic context or the 
type of industry in which the company operates. 
f) Specific mechanisms to adapt incentive programs for companies with controlling 
shareholders, when there is an overlap between control and management. For these companies, the need 
to monitor agency conflict can be reduced. 
Additionally, the use of demographic data with grouping variables can be explored in future 
studies as a way of expanding the conception on how personal characteristics can be better combined 
with the compensation model to be applied. Demographic data, such as education level and training, can 
help complement the study. 
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